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1. Climate Change
The most pressing of these is climate change. Every year 
we release more and more carbon dioxide and other
“greenhouse gases” into the atmosphere. The debate 
about whether this is changing our climate is now over – it
absolutely is. The debate now is about what we need to do 
to reduce those emissions, and how fast we need to do it.
Scientists warn of a temperature “threshold”: any increase
above an average 2º centigrade by the end of this century
could trigger “irreversible” changes in the climate. In which
case, there would be nothing much we could do to halt the
“climate chaos” we would have unleashed.
Governments have gradually been getting to grips with this
grim reality over the last decade, and to its enormous credit,
the UK Government has often found itself leading the way.
We have committed ourselves to:
> a 12.5% cut in greenhouse gases (on 1990 levels) by
2010 as our share of Europe’s mandatory target under
the Kyoto Protocol; 
> a 20% cut in CO2 by 2010;
> an aspiration to reduce levels of CO2 by 60% by 2050,
with real progress towards that target by 2020.
Given current evidence of how fast the climate is changing,
even that 60% may not be enough. 
So it’s absolutely right for the UK to set itself ambitious
targets, even if many European countries are
underperforming. Even if the Bush Administration is doing
nothing. Even if China, India and other developing countries
have yet to address their own rapidly rising emissions. 
2. Security of supply
At the same time, there are growing concerns about how
we’re going to meet our own energy needs in the future –
particularly in terms of electricity generation. The recent
stand-off between Russia and the Ukraine regarding supplies
of gas has reinforced just how critical this challenge now is. 
Today, coal provides for around 30% of our electricity and
nuclear for around 20%. Most of the rest comes from gas-
fired power stations, with only a small proportion coming
from renewables. But many of our coal and nuclear power
stations are going to have to close over the next 15 years,
and it’s by no means clear how all that “capacity” is going 
to be replaced to ensure “that the lights stay on”. 
Let alone replaced in a way that doesn’t increase emissions 
of CO2. 
It’s in that context that there has been a surge of interest in
the potential for a new generation of nuclear reactors to help
fill that gap. The nuclear industry has advanced its own cause
with renewed vigour, and all sorts of commentators have
dusted down their prejudices to declare themselves 100% for
or 100% against nuclear.
Energy consumption throughout 
the world is continuing to grow from
year to year, as it has done for many
decades. But some of the traditional
sources of energy are becoming
scarcer, and the consumption of fossil
fuels is causing our climate to change
faster than most people imagine.
Every country in the world faces very
tough decisions on energy policy in
the years ahead. The old certainties
are long gone; new pressures demand
urgent attention.
Energy
futures 
Part one
3. The energy review
In January this year, the Government announced another
review of energy policy: 
Our Energy Challenge: Securing Clean, Affordable Energy 
for the Long-Term. 
This comes just three years on from the last Energy White
Paper, which was thought at the time to have dealt with all
relevant issues, leading some people to be very suspicious 
of the Government’s real motives in going over old ground 
in this way.
However, as far as the Sustainable Development Commission is
concerned, we welcome the Review on the understanding that:
> It will be explicitly conducted within the Government’s
own framework for sustainable development 
(see below);
> It will be conducted transparently and with due regard
paid to all shades of opinion;
> It will be seen as the start of a process of engagement
with the general public on long-term energy futures 
for the UK.
Anticipating that the focus of this new consultation would be
on the nuclear option, the Commission decided early last year
that we would review the latest evidence base on all the key
nuclear issues – cost, waste, decommissioning, security and 
so on. All of those issues are discussed, one by one, in the
next section.
Together with this document, we are simultaneously
publishing the eight different studies that we commissioned,
together with our own summary and analysis of those findings,
The Role of Nuclear Power in a Low Carbon Economy.
Our purpose in undertaking this substantive piece of work is
to highlight both the complexity of the issues raised (there is
much less “black and white” about the nuclear question than
most people would have you believe – and many more grey
areas in between), and the importance in seeking answers to
the questions in a genuinely open-minded and rigorous way.
The Commission decided to address this challenge as a
journey of exploration: first, analysing the core problems; 
then reviewing the evidence as regards the pros and cons 
of nuclear power; then weighing up public perceptions and
different ethical approaches; then assessing the viability of
alternative approaches; then coming to our own conclusions 
– and, finally, offering our advice to Ministers in that spirit of
genuine enquiry.
As a group of sixteen individuals, brought together from
different sectors and walks of life by our passion for and
expertise in sustainable development, it would be surprising 
if we had all ended up in exactly the same point at the end
of that journey. And we didn’t, as you will see.
But nor will the experts. Or our MPs. Or environmentalists. 
Or the Cabinet. Or the general public. This is difficult territory,
with no absolute rights or wrongs. 
4. Sustainable
development
One thing is clear, however: it is only a proper understanding
of sustainable development that will enable us to make the
right decisions in this area. 
Sustainable development is all about improving people’s
quality of life today without damaging the prospects of people
tomorrow. In the Government’s Sustainable Development
Strategy, Securing the Future, this is how it’s interpreted: 
New framework goal for sustainable development
The goal of sustainable development is to enable all people
throughout the world to satisfy their basic needs and enjoy
a better quality of life, without compromising the quality of
life of future generations.
For the UK Government and the Developed Administrations,
that goal will be pursued in an integrated way through 
a sustainable, innovative and productive economy that
delivers high levels of employment; and a just society that
promotes social inclusion, sustainable communities and
personal wellbeing. This will be done in ways that protect
and enhance the physical and natural environment, and 
use resources and energy as efficiently as possible.
Securing the Future
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The Strategy is based on five overarching Principles and we
have used those Principles as the basis for all our analysis 
and for our Recommendations. In so doing, a number of
preliminary conclusions are immediately apparent:
1. This new Review should in no way be seen as setting aside
the principal conclusions of the 2003 Energy White Paper.
The Commission wholeheartedly supported the conclusions
in the White Paper then, and continues to support them
today, with its primary focus on energy efficiency,
renewables, and combined heat and power (CHP).
2. We are deeply disappointed that the new consultation
document (Our Energy Challenge) fails to frame the
questions it asks within the Government’s own sustainable
development strategy. This already makes it a far less
valuable exercise than it should have been.
3. The new Review focusses more on supply than on
demand management. When contemplating the nuclear
option, this may very well obscure reality. People forget 
that whilst nuclear power provides around 20% of our
electricity, that’s only 8% of the UK’s total energy needs.
Over half the gas we use in the UK, for example, is for
heating and cooking in our homes, and nuclear power 
will obviously do nothing to replace this need.
4. Such an approach may also divert attention away from 
the single most important aspect of any energy strategy: 
it is energy efficiency that will make or break that
strategy. With or without nuclear power. 
It is the view of the Sustainable Development Commission
that this Government has signally failed to deliver the 
kind of Energy Efficiency Strategy that will be needed to
underpin a genuinely sustainable energy future for the 
UK. Whilst it has had some success through the Energy
Efficiency Commitment, the savings made have been
woefully inadequate in the face of rising energy demand 
– as revealed in its own Review of the Climate Change
Programme. Achieving higher energy standards in our
homes and offices has been an area of particular weakness.
Energy efficiency must therefore remain the absolute
lynchpin of any future energy strategy. Our Energy Challenge
demonstrates little if any understanding of this priority.
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Living within 
environmental limits
Respecting the limits of the planet's environment,
resources and biodiversity – to improve our
environment and ensure that the natural
resources needed for life are unimpaired and
remain so for future generations.
Achieving a 
Sustainable economy
Building a strong, stable and
sustainable economy which
provides prosperity and
opportunities for all, and in which
environmental and social costs 
fall on those who impose them
(polluter pays), and efficient
resource use is incentivised.
Promoting good 
governance
Actively promoting effective,
participative systems of 
governance in all levels of 
society – engaging people’s
creativity, energy, and diversity.
Using sound science
responsibility
Ensuring policy is developed 
and implemented on the basis 
of strong scientific evidence, 
whilst taking into account 
scientific uncertainty (through the
precautionary principle) as well 
as public attitudes and values.
Ensuring a strong, 
healthy and just society
Meeting the diverse needs of all people in
existing and future communities, promoting
personal wellbeing, social cohesion and
inclusion, and creating equal opportunity for all.
Securing the Future – delivering UK sustainable development strategy
5. We want to put this conclusion up front for one simple
reason: as politicians get all steamed up about “nuclear 
vs. renewables”, and our media roll out this mischievously
polarised debate, the all-important priority of energy
efficiency will invariably be ignored. This tends to be the
way the debate is ‘framed’, and the real challenge (how
do we free ourselves of our dependency on fossil fuels 
as the impacts of accelerated climate change worsen) 
is often ignored.
But from a genuine sustainability perspective, it matters
little if a unit of electricity is generated from a wind 
turbine or from a nuclear reactor if it is then shamefully
wasted through inadequate regulation, poor design or
thoughtless lifestyles.
We will return to the consequences of making an
absolutely priority of energy efficiency in Part 4.
Guiding principles
Energy efficiency must
therefore remain the
absolute lynchpin of any
future energy strategy.
“
”
1. Introduction
1.1 The Commission’s research is based on the assumption
that if a decision is made to invest in a nuclear
replacement programme, then it makes most sense 
to do so by committing to a number of new reactors –
perhaps as many as 8 or 9. Although there are some
experts who do not support this approach, experience 
in other countries shows that this is the most realistic
way of keeping down construction costs. 
1.2 We looked at two scenarios at different points in our
research: replacement of existing nuclear plant, which
would mean a programme generating around 10,000
MegaWatts (or 10GW); or an expanded programme
which would roughly double current capacity – at 20,000
MegaWatts (or 20GW).
1.3 We were disconcerted at a number of points in our
enquiry to see just how little hard-edged information 
is as yet in the public domain. Especially as regards a
new generation of nuclear reactors. For those seeking
any kind of “objectivity” in their appraisal of different
energy supply options, this is both problematic (in that
few “factual statements” can necessarily be treated 
as incontrovertible fact, let alone “gospel truth”) 
and frustrating. 
1.4 Our Energy Challenge offers no information
whatsoever on what any new nuclear programme
might look like, presumably on the grounds that
this would be premature. Unfortunately, people are
therefore being asked to comment on the potential
contribution of a new nuclear programme without
any of the key aspects (regarding reactor design,
cost, waste management, liability issues, security
issues, and so on) having been addressed.
2. Nuclear power’s
contribution to
reducing emissions
of CO2
It’s clear that nuclear power could, in principle, play a big part
in substituting for some of the fossil fuel generating plants
(coal or gas) that might otherwise be needed to help fill the
generation gap.
Assuming that we’re talking primarily about gas-fired plants,
then a replacement programme for our existing nuclear
programme (at 10GW) would displace about 6.7 million
tonnes of carbon (MtC) every year once all the plants were
up and running. That’s equal to around a 4% cut in annual 
CO2 emissions from 1990 levels.
An expanded programme (at 20GW) would displace around
13.4MtC, equal to an 8% cut. And if it’s coal-fired plants that
are being displaced, then the savings are substantially higher.
This would represent a major contribution, and there’s little
point in opponents of nuclear power denying that reality.
Everybody acknowledges that it’s going to be an enormous
challenge to hit that 60% target by 2050 – let alone an even
tougher target if that’s what the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change indicates may be necessary in its Fourth
Assessment Report in 2007. Nuclear power could, in principle,
deliver part of the required reduction in emissions, which is
why it’s perfectly legitimate for there to be a full examination
of all the options available at this time. 
The basic fuel used in a nuclear reactor is enriched uranium.
Unlike coal, oil or gas, this releases zero CO2 when it’s used,
which is the principal reason people have come to the
conclusion that we must have nuclear power in our electricity
mix to help reduce overall emissions of CO2. 
However, this does not make nuclear a “carbon-free” source
of electricity, as is often claimed. A lot of energy is consumed
both during plant construction and at different points in 
the nuclear fuel cycle, from the mining of the uranium ore
through to fuel processing and to final decommissioning and
waste management. 
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Calculating just how much CO2 is emitted by plant construction
and the nuclear fuel cycle is a controversial business. Our
evidence suggests an average of around 4.5 tonnes of carbon
for every GW of electricity the reactor generates – in comparison
to 97 tonnes from existing gas-fired power stations. However,
this figure does not include any future emissions from either
decommissioning or waste management, as these are almost
impossible to estimate at the moment.
So, not a huge figure, but not zero. We should therefore
beware of people who seek to obscure this fact by describing
nuclear power as “carbon-neutral” or “zero-carbon”. “Low
carbon” is the only proper description.
There’s then the issue of timing.
Even if the Government short-cuts proper process to “give 
the green light” to a new nuclear power programme, we
estimate that the earliest the first reactor would come on
stream would be around 2015. Thereafter, we assume a
maximum “build rate” of 1GW a year, as the capacity of 
the construction industry will most likely be restricted.
What that means is that a new nuclear power programme
would make no difference at all to achieving our 20% CO2
reduction target for 2010, and will make only a limited
impact by 2020 when we should, in the words of the Energy
White Paper, be making significant progress towards our 
60% reduction target for 2050. This is a major problem. 
It is of course true that we must pay equal attention to the 
next thirty years after 2020 (through to 2050), but given 
our growing concerns about climate change, we must be 
well on our way towards our longer-term targets by 2020
through other non-nuclear options.
If we don’t achieve the dramatic energy efficiency gains we
need by then, and if we don’t bring on enough renewables
by then, and if we don’t re-design our distribution network 
by then to accelerate the uptake of small-scale energy
generation, and if we don’t make enough progress in terms 
of transforming our own lifestyles and mindsets by then, 
our view is that the amount of nuclear power available 
to us from that point on may well prove to be of secondary
importance from the perspective of climate change. 
Those comments do not of course apply to the issue of 
long-term energy security, which is addressed on page 11.
3. Safety
Although nuclear safety remains a big issue in terms of public
perception, the evidence shows that UK civil nuclear reactors
have a very good safety record. There is little reason to
suppose that a new generation of nuclear reactors will not 
be built to the same demanding health and safety standards.
As far as low-level radiation is concerned, the protection 
of both employees and the general public is covered in 
the UK by a strict legal framework. The amount of radiation
discharged through the operation of the reactors themselves
is actually very small; it is the re-processing of the spent 
fuel that causes the problems (accounting for 83% of all the
radiation attributed to the nuclear industry across the EU),
although actual radiation doses are small. 
That record won’t necessarily allay public anxiety. Chernobyl
remains a powerful symbol of just how serious and long-lived
the consequences of a nuclear accident can be, however
“remote” such a risk is.
That kind of risk also weighs heavily on investors who know
only too well that this is an industry measured as much by 
its weakest link as by years of unblemished safety. 
4. Nuclear waste
This is recognised as one of the biggest of the dilemmas
faced by advocates of a new nuclear power programme.
Existing government policy is that there should be no new
reactors built until there is an acceptable solution to the
problem of nuclear waste. Public opinion strongly endorses
that position, and would be outraged by any breach of it. 
But what exactly is meant by “acceptable”, and who exactly
will define it?
Our evidence confirms that only Finland has as yet come up
with a long-term solution as to what to do with its high-level
nuclear waste (HLW) that seems to command reasonable
public support. Yet the industry has long insisted that there’s
no technological barrier to finding an acceptable solution, 
and that the problems are all political or economic. They feel
very strongly that it would be entirely wrong to deprive both
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this and future generations of the benefits of nuclear power
through an exaggerated and largely “unscientific” set of
concerns about nuclear waste.
It is also true that the volumes of HLW are indeed small. 
It’s the intermediate level and low level waste that make 
up 98% of the total volume of waste in the UK – but only
10% of the total amount of radioactivity.
It is important, however, to note that spent nuclear fuel
(which contains both plutonium and uranium) is not actually
classified as waste here in the UK as we have a policy 
to reprocess that spent fuel as an “economically viable
resource”. If reprocessing were to cease (and there are many
experts, even inside the industry, who believe that is now
inevitable), then there would be more HLW to deal with. 
The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM)
will be reporting to government in the summer, with
recommendations as to the best means of disposing of
nuclear waste. If its recommendations are accepted, the
Government will then have to determine a process for
selecting the most appropriate site – a process which has
caused huge controversy in the past and will no doubt do 
so again in the future. 
Only at that point, in our opinion, will the UK Government be
able to claim that it has an acceptable solution – even if that
claim is still emphatically rejected by the communities most
directly impacted.
There are critical ethical issues here, which are addressed 
in the next Part. And there are critical economic issues.
Evidence to CoRWM has already put a “ball-park” price tag 
of £13 bn on the most rigorous solution for dealing with
existing waste – that of deep geological storage.
Firm estimates cannot yet be made for levels of waste arising
from any new nuclear programme, although our evidence
indicates that the volumes of waste arising from new reactor
designs could be substantially less than from our existing
nuclear reactors. 
5. Decommissioning
Again, there is widespread public concern about dealing 
with our existing “nuclear legacy”, both in terms of safety 
and cost. The most recent assessment from the Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority suggested that an accelerated
decommissioning programme will cost approximately £56 bn.
Much of this relates to military facilities or nuclear power
plants that no longer generate electricity (such as Dounreay),
but our evidence still suggests costs of between £1.3 bn 
and £1.8 bn for the decommissioning of each of our existing
power plants – largely because little consideration was given
to decommissioning in the design of these reactors.
However, it’s important to point out that such costs may 
not add much to the price paid for each kilowatt hour of
electricity generated by a nuclear reactor. The evidence also
suggests that new reactor designs (where decommissioning
will be designed in from the start) will entail substantially
lower costs in this area.
Nonetheless, these very large sums of money have a
significant ethical dimension: unless the actual users of the
electricity generated by a nuclear reactor pay explicitly and in
full for the total costs of the decommissioning of that reactor,
then it is clear that one of the key aspects of sustainable
development (in terms of “intergenerational equity”) is being
set aside. We return to this point in the next Part.
6. The economics 
of nuclear power
It remains as hard today to calculate the full costs of nuclear
power as it has been at any time over the last forty years.
Because of the historical links between our military nuclear
programme and our civil nuclear programme, secrecy 
was endemic, and keeping UK citizens in the dark or even
deliberately deceived about the costs of nuclear power 
was standard practice prior to the semi-privatisation of the
industry in the 1990s.
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Over and above the secrecy problems, it is very difficult 
to get any accurate assessment of cost. Capital costs (for
construction) are huge; operating costs are low. Fuel cycle
costs depend entirely on what technologies are being used.
As we’ve seen, the costs of decommissioning and waste
management are very difficult to estimate. And the way
nuclear power is financed (with or without government
support) has a huge bearing on final costs. 
Making comparisons (in pence per kilowatt hour
generated) is therefore fraught with difficulties.
The new evidence we commissioned for this study suggests
that it’s going to be very difficult to estimate total costs of 
a new programme based on any new reactor design. All we
have to go on are industry estimates, and our evidence clearly
demonstrates, on the basis of historical performance, that
considerable scepticism is warranted in assessing the reliability
of estimates from the industry itself – or indeed from
governments that are not acting in a genuinely impartial way. 
Our evidence emphasises the uncertainties in arriving at a definite
cost (per kilowatt hour) for nuclear power that would allow
straightforward comparisons with other energy technologies.
The results from eight recent studies precisely demonstrates
the nature of the problem. The wide divergences between
cost expectations are attributed mainly to:
> differences in the assumptions about capital costs,
> differences in assumptions about discount rates
and/or the cost of capital (including different
financing assumptions).
(The data are presented using the original currency units 
to avoid the complications of currency conversion and the
distortions this would represent.)
The cost of nuclear power (in pence (or cents) per kilowatt
hour) is heavily dependent on capital costs, which account for
around 60-75% of total generating costs. This makes the cost
of nuclear new-build very sensitive to both project overruns
and to the cost of capital – the interest or "discount" rate
charged on investment capital. This interest rate is likely to 
be higher for nuclear than for other energy investments if
nuclear is perceived as a "riskier" investment. This may well
be the case given the uncertainties that exist around knowing
a realistic capital cost for a new reactor before one is built.  
This means that while the figures quoted in the table above
may well represent a range of achievable costs if all goes
well, they do not capture the real uncertainties that exist in
current UK circumstances, including the long-term costs of
waste disposal and decommissioning. Our evidence indicates
there is a no independently verifiable way of knowing the
realistic capital cost of a new UK reactor before one is built.
The Commission continues to see nuclear power as a 
high-cost option. But so too are subsidised wind-power
programmes or carbon capture and storage. Once built,
nuclear reactors have a valuable role in the generation 
mix as base load providers producing low carbon electricity 
at low operating costs for many years. 
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Organisation/Department Range of costs
(N.B. In original
currency units)
1 Performance & Innovation Unit 2.5-4.0 p/kWh
(Cabinet Office)
2 Interdepartmental Analysts’ Group 2.6-4.0 p/kWh
(DTI/Defra)
3 Energy White Paper modelling work 3.4-3.7 p/kWh
(DTI)
4 Royal Academy of Engineering (UK) 3.26 p/kWh
5 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 4.9-7.9 USc/kWh
(USA)
6 Nuclear Energy Agency/International 3-5 USc/kWh
Energy Agency
7 University of Chicago (USA) 5.2-7.1 USc/kWh
8 Scully Capital Services (USA) 3.4-3.7 USc/kWh
Details on all these studies are provided in our evidence base
(Paper 4 – Economics of Nuclear New-Build)
In the UK’s liberalised energy market, it is investors who will
ultimately have to make those judgements. But our evidence
suggests that nuclear power will find it difficult to compete 
in those liberalised markets without substantial public subsidy,
and without the Government taking on some kind of liability
in the event of any serious accident or for the long-term costs
associated with waste disposal and decommissioning. 
The industry seems to have an unwarranted expectation 
of continuing to be subsidised. This would appear to be
confirmed by the recommendation from the Chief Executive 
of the Nuclear Industry Association that HM Treasury should
guarantee a minimum price for nuclear electricity over the
forty year lifetime of each reactor – presumably to prevent
nuclear power being rendered “unprofitable” because of a
decline in wholesale electricity prices or in the event of new
technologies coming forward during that time that turn out to
be cheaper. This gives some indication of just how brazen the
industry is likely to be in pursuing its own self-interest, albeit
in the name of the national interest.
That said, it is of course open to our Government (subject to
EU rules) to provide that level of support – as part and parcel,
for instance, of any Climate Change Programme to reduce
emissions of CO2. There is no reason, on the face of it, why
nuclear should not be treated on exactly the same basis as
any other low carbon technology, if that’s the basis on which
the Government makes subsidies available. 
However, were any government to contemplate the use 
of taxpayers’ money (or consumers’ money, through an
additional levy on our electricity bills) for this purpose,
it would then be compelled to demonstrate that such 
a subsidy incontrovertibly represented better value for
money for the taxpayer than a similar level of subsidy
for other low or zero carbon options.
7. Proliferation risks
Proliferation remains a matter of high public concern, and
justifiably so. As can be seen from the historical record, it 
is impossible to guarantee, over time, that any civil nuclear
programme will not be developed into a military capability. 
As a matter of record, the International Atomic Energy Agency
tells us that we might well have ended up with between
thirty and forty nuclear weapon states were it not for the
Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and 
that more states have actually abandoned potential nuclear
weapons programmes than have gone on to develop them. 
But as we’ve seen recently with North Korea and Iran, 
dealing with states that withdraw from Treaties or potentially
act in breach of them, is a hugely delicate and controversial
challenge. Many believe there is no satisfactory answer to 
the risk that an expansion of nuclear power programmes 
will increase the risk of more countries acquiring nuclear
weapons capability.
And it would not prove easy for the UK to argue that nuclear
power is a critical aspect of its own strategy for reducing
emissions of greenhouse gases while simultaneously claiming
that a country like Iran should not be permitted to follow 
the same course of action. Under the terms of the Framework
Convention on Climate Change, we are legally obliged to 
help other countries develop appropriate carbon abatement
technologies through technology transfers.
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8. Security issues
This is obviously a matter of much greater concern to
governments since we all became swept up in “the war
against terror”. High levels of security at nuclear power
stations are regularly reviewed against current intelligence 
on terrorist groups, though it has to be pointed out that 
this has not stopped Greenpeace demonstrating on a 
number of occasions how easily some of these defences 
can be breached. 
As regards the threat of a head-on attack, the industry and
the UK Government are as one in asserting that modern
reactors are very unlikely to be breached even by a crashing
commercial airliner, and that standard shut-down procedures
would minimise or eliminate altogether the risks of any
serious damage being done. Other commentators remain
deeply sceptical of our ability to foresee future terrorist
threats, and are at least as concerned about the risks entailed
in the movement of reactor-grade fuel or spent fuel during
the nuclear fuel cycle, raising fears of their potential misuse 
in some kind of “dirty bomb”.
Whatever one feels about the acceptability of this kind of 
risk (which is by definition all but unquantifiable), no one
disputes the high level of security-related expenditure
required (on an ongoing, permanent basis) to minimise 
and manage those risks.
9. Opportunity costs
We believe there are four different kinds of potential
opportunity costs as they relate to nuclear power – in other
words, what other courses of action or opportunities might be
blocked off as a consequence of going for the nuclear option: 
1. Investment in renewables/energy efficiency
2. Political leadership
3. Infrastructure
4. Economic development
9.1 Potential impact on investments 
in renewables/energy efficiency
Somewhat to the surprise of some Commissioners, our
evidence shows that there is unlikely to be much impact 
from a new, privately financed nuclear programme on the
availability of capital from investors to fund renewables or
other low-carbon technologies. This is reassuring, although 
we are struck by the fact that there are already serious
problems in securing enough capital for the UK’s ambitious
off-shore wind programme.
However, we are concerned that support for a new nuclear
programme could compete directly with existing public policy
measures on energy efficiency. A levy on consumers’ bills 
to support new nuclear might be offset by government by 
a reduction in the targets for future periods of the Energy
Efficiency Commitment, to help keep prices down. This 
would reduce carbon emission savings from the domestic
sector. The same impact might also be seen with the
Renewables Obligation.
9.2 Potential impact on “share of political leadership”
We are much less sanguine on this score. Were it to be
decided to proceed with a new reactor programme (once 
an “acceptable” solution to the waste issue has been found),
there is no doubt that this decision would command a
substantial slice of political leadership – from whichever party
is then in power. Political attention would shift, and in all
likelihood undermine efforts to pursue a strategy based on
energy efficiency, renewables and more CHP – not least
because any such decision is very unlikely to win widespread
public support, as of now, as we’ll see in the next Part.
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This may be seen as a rather crude “either/or” analysis: 
if investors can pursue both options simultaneously, why
shouldn’t politicians be equally capable of doing the same?
We would be more confident of their capacity in this regard
had we seen a full-on effort being made over the last three
years to deliver on the Energy White Paper. But we haven’t.
Performance has been patchy, inadequately supported in both
human and financial terms, and subject to constant inter-
departmental incoherence.
Worse yet, even the speculative prospect of an expanded
nuclear power programme in the future is already being
treated by some politicians as a “get out of jail free card”, 
and by some energy users as reassurance that the pressure
for increased energy efficiency will soon be eased. 
Getting market incentives, fiscal instruments and regulatory
interventions effectively aligned to drive forward a strategy
based on efficiency and renewables is a genuinely demanding
political exercise, with multiple stakeholders to be brought 
on board, conflicts to be reconciled and compromises to be
made. How much simpler (it is now being argued by some)
to drive through a programme of new reactors.
9.3 Potential impact on the UK’S distribution network
Having secured far more ambitious energy efficiency gains
than the Government has even begun to contemplate, the
Commission’s long–term vision of a genuinely sustainable
energy future would see much more of our reduced 
energy needs either generated locally (through major new
investments in micro-generation technologies of different
kinds, including micro-wind turbines, solar water heaters,
micro-CHP systems, biomass boilers, ground-source heat
pumps, photovoltaics and so on), or through large-scale
renewables such as off-shore wind and, possibly, tidal
barrages and tidal stream technologies. We believe substantial
investment will be needed in both, and in our distribution
network to deliver these prospective benefits.
This raises the difficult issue of “network lock-in”. A new
nuclear programme would commit the UK to nuclear
technology, and to the large-scale, centralised supply
infrastructure needed to benefit from it, for at least fifty years.
In the near term, that will divert investment away both from
the kind of network reinforcement needed to cope with high
levels of micro-generation, and from new transmission lines
(or “interconnectors”) needed to take advantage of large-
scale off-shore wind and other renewable technologies.
In the long run, we have no doubt that there will be
significant advances in all sorts of decentralised energy
technologies, and there is a high risk that our dependence 
on centralised supplies may “lock out” these alternatives.
Decisions made to support nuclear would have few knock-on
benefits elsewhere in our energy economy (transport, heat,
use of gas in our homes etc), in contrast to the kind of
alternative approaches mapped out in the next Part. Even 
if we did bring forward a nuclear programme, we’d still
have to address all those other difficult issues as well. 
9.4 Potential impact on economic development
As Commissioners, we look out on a world in which every
nation (from the richest to the poorest) is imminently going
to have to come to terms with the same challenges the UK
faces: an end to cheap fossil fuels; dramatic changes in the
production and use of energy to confront the threat of climate
change; the growing importance of energy security. In that
global context, we ask ourselves a simple question: how
many of those nations are going to address those challenges
predominantly through nuclear power? 
The contrast here is with some of the alternative technologies
we briefly profile in Part 4: energy efficiency; large-scale
renewables and micro-generation (both of which will
inevitably prove to be far more important to most countries
than nuclear power); energy from waste and biomass, 
which will be of huge importance throughout the world, 
but particularly in developing countries; carbon capture and
storage – potentially a multi-billion dollar industry in which 
UK companies including BP, Shell and Scottish and Southern
Energy are already making huge investments. The export
potential in all of these areas could be substantial.
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The UK was once the world leader in wind power. These 
days, Germany and Denmark have taken on this title due 
to significant investment over the last fifteen years. To many
people, it does seem bizarre if not perverse that we could be
about to downplay yet again the importance of so many of
the technologies that will drive future growth and business
success in the vast majority of countries.
10. Security of supply
Although nuclear power is often described as a “domestic
energy source”, offering the prospect of rock-solid security 
of supply over time, that isn’t strictly accurate. Given that we
do not have any uranium deposits of our own, it still has to
be imported, raising questions about both availability of
supply over time and short-term security of supply. 
However, both the costs of treated uranium used in reactors
and the volumes required are relatively small. Contrary to
some reports, our evidence suggests that there are unlikely to
be any major concerns over the long-term availability of raw
uranium; as demand increases, exploration for new resources
will resume and new mines will be opened. There are some
concerns over the security of uranium supplies over the next
decade, but this is due to a shortage of investment in new
mines rather than a lack of uranium resources.
However, the quality of the ore extracted will remain a big
issue (the lower the concentration of uranium in the ore, the
more energy is required to process it), as will the substantial
environmental and social impacts of any mining operations. 
These issues should not be underestimated. The historical
record of mining companies in setting aside land rights 
of indigenous people and in causing massive pollution to 
both surface and ground waters, is a disgraceful one. With
new reserves as likely to emerge in countries like Russia 
and Kazakhstan as in “established” producer countries 
such as Australia and Canada, investors in any new nuclear
programme in the UK would need to ensure that their supply
chain was as socially and environmentally responsible as for
any other industry.
All that said, there is no doubt that nuclear power offers
substantial long-term benefits to any government seeking to
reduce the risks entailed in purchasing oil, gas or coal from
countries that do not necessarily inspire confidence as to their
future stability or integrity. The stand-off between Russia and
the Ukraine has provided a sobering lesson for many western
governments. Again, it would be folly to underestimate the
contribution that nuclear power could make to filling the
“generation gap” if it comes down to a choice between
imported hydrocarbons and nuclear power. 
However, it is important to remind people at this stage that
we are still only talking about a total of 8% of the UK’s total
energy needs coming from any replacement nuclear power
programme. It is clearly not the case that “only nuclear 
power can address the challenge of energy security for 
the UK”, as is sometimes claimed both by politicians and
industry representatives.
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1. Public opinion
Nuclear power remains an extremely controversial area of
public policy. Government interventions must therefore be
particularly sensitive to public opinion and to the way in
which the public is likely to respond. Sensitive not just to 
the substance of any decisions taken, but to the way in 
which it takes them and subsequently seeks to pursue them.
Rebuilding trust around such discussions is critically important.
Ministers already know they would have a massive challenge
on their hands were they to decide to pursue the nuclear
option. Most surveys show that there is currently little explicit
support for a new programme of nuclear reactors, especially
when compared directly with renewable technologies.
However, it is also true that rising concerns about climate
change may well persuade many more people that a new
nuclear programme is now inevitable if we are to restrict
emissions of CO2. The most recent MORI poll (commissioned
by the Tyndall Centre) showed that more than 50% of 
people would support more nuclear power if it could be
demonstrated that it reduced the threat of climate change.
Our evidence should remind Ministers that they would 
be well-advised to reflect both on the fiasco of the GM
controversy in the late 1990s and on the way in which the
nuclear debate in the UK has been “framed” in the past. 
The GM debate clearly demonstrated what happens when a
government is determined to push ahead with an “unpopular”
technology at all costs, dismissing all concerns on the part 
of the general public as insubstantial “perceptions” – making
the contrast with the much harder “facts” embodied in the
“scientific evidence” to which they as decision-makers had
exclusive access. 
Which makes it all the more important to revisit earlier
nuclear controversies, and to analyse what it was that 
lay behind those controversies. As our research on 
public perceptions puts it: “the record suggests that 
on nuclear–related issues such as economic viability, 
the challenges of secure waste management, radiation
uncertainties, and the commercial implications of 
prospective regulatory pressures, wider public 
understandings have in the past proved more realistic 
than many of those of the industry or government.”
The analysis goes on to suggest that it wasn’t just the
technology itself (the nuclear reactor and its associated 
fuel cycle), but the whole set of government and industry
institutions on which the technology depended that made
people so intensely suspicious of what was being proposed.
The nuclear industry seemed to require special, unexplained
“privileges” to justify its existence. 
It would be as well for the current Government to avoid any
processes that push nuclear power back into that particular
reputation status. It did not help, in that regard, that the
Government has just asked the Health and Safety Executive 
to carry out a new study into licensing procedures for nuclear
power stations – at the same time as professing to have a
completely open mind on nuclear.
It is for that reason that the Commission is still recommending
to Ministers that the current Energy Review should be seen
primarily as just the start of a process to consider long-term
energy options for the UK. It should come forward with 
broad-brush recommendations as to any new strategic
developments (on carbon capture and storage, for instance, 
or micro-generation, or indeed nuclear power) that it feels 
are now in the national interest. 
These should then be the subject of a further period of proper
public consultation. Very careful thought should be given,
before the end of the Review, as to how that consultation
process should be designed and funded to maximise public
engagement and optimise conditions for public trust and
confidence in any ensuing decision. As our research points
out: “truly sustainable energy policies seem likely to benefit
from going with the grain of wider public concerns, rather
than from rubbing up against them.”
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2. Ethical
considerations
Almost all decisions about complex technologies, however
clinical and “fact-based” they may appear at one level, have
an ethical dimension – in terms of prospective “winners and
losers”, impacts on lifestyle, culture and society, and so on.
But the debate about nuclear power is uniquely charged with
such considerations. 
Going right back to the definition first used in the Brundtland
Report in 1987 (“development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs.”), the concept of sustainable
development has consistently stressed the obligations of one
generation to all future generations, both in terms of access
to nature’s resources, systems and services, and in terms of
not “dumping” the direct or indirect costs of development on
those who have no share in the benefits of that development.
Justice between generations (or “intergenerational equity”) 
is another way of describing it. 
Nuclear technologies pose complex ethical dilemmas in 
this regard. High-level nuclear waste remains dangerously
radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years; nuclear
reactors will need to be “mothballed” for decades whilst
decommissioning takes place. A proportion both of the risks
and of the ongoing costs associated with waste management
and decommissioning will therefore fall on citizens who were
neither party to the decisions taken to build the reactors in
the first place, nor beneficiaries of the electricity that flowed
from those reactors during their lifetime. 
In some ways, a clear acknowledgement of this ethical
dilemma is implicit in the Government’s own decision not 
to proceed with a further generation of nuclear reactors
unless and until an “acceptable” solution has been found 
to the problems associated with existing volumes of nuclear
waste. To add to those volumes of waste without such 
a solution being to hand would indeed be ethically
unacceptable on every count. 
For some Commissioners, with the very limited information
on future waste management and decommissioning
strategies that we have available to us today, it is simply not
possible to be true to the principles of sustainable development
whilst approving a new generation of nuclear reactors. 
For other Commissioners, by contrast, current knowledge is
sufficient to persuade them that the hazards associated both
with waste management and decommissioning will remain
acceptably low, and that it is not unreasonable to ask future
generations to bear some small part of the costs entailed in
our generation doing what we feel we have to do to reduce
emissions of CO2 – for the benefit of future generations, it 
has to be said, as well as of our own.
For many people in the UK, it’s clear that they can see no
way out of the current set of energy dilemmas (climate
change, rising prices, security of supply issues, declining North
Sea assets) without having recourse to the nuclear option.
Some feel genuinely enthusiastic about this option, especially
those who have never “lost faith” with the potential of
nuclear power; for others, nuclear is rather more the “least
worst option”, no cause for celebration in itself, but a gritty
necessity given where we now find ourselves at the start of
the 21st Century. 
After all, if there really was no alternative, then any
government would be duty-bound to pursue some kind
of nuclear option – however risky, costly and unpopular
that might prove to be.
But what if there is an alternative strategy, a very
different “least worst option” that obviates the need
for the nuclear option?
Though we have commissioned no additional research for this
part of our report, we are drawing here on a well-established
body of modelling work already carried out for the
Government in the run up to the 2003 Energy White Paper, 
as well as on our own work done at the same time and on
further research findings that have emerged since 2003.
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1. Introduction
A huge amount of work has gone into modelling countless
different scenarios over the last few years. The Commission
has reviewed many of these, not with a view of coming to
any fixed conclusion as to which might be “the best”, but
simply to test for degrees of robustness, both technologically
and financially. 
(A summary of the principal sources on which we’ve drawn
can be found in our evidence base: see Paper Two – Reducing
CO2 Emissions: Nuclear and the Alternatives).
In this respect, the UK is very fortunate. Many studies 
have demonstrated how we can dramatically reduce total
energy consumption. We have huge wind power resources,
and substantial tidal, wave, biomass and solar resources. 
Recent work by the Energy Saving Trust estimates that
microgeneration could provide 30 – 40% of the UK’s 
electricity by 2050. 
Of course, it’s not quite as easy as that. Technological
potential is one thing; economic viability quite another.
Theoretically, we could seek to achieve a completely zero
carbon society over the next twenty years, but the cost 
would be astronomical. The economic and social damage 
that would be inflicted on people would clearly run counter 
to the meaning of sustainable development outlined earlier
in this paper.
2. Energy efficiency
As we made clear on page 4, we believe that energy
efficiency should be set absolutely at the heart of whatever
long-term energy strategy the Government now brings
forward. The case for this is eloquently argued in the
Government’s own Plan for Action on Energy Efficiency,
published in April 2004 (as part of its follow up to the 2003
Energy White Paper), identifying the efficient use of energy 
as “the most cost-effective way” to meet all four of the
Government’s energy goals:
> “Reducing carbon emissions: using energy as
efficiently as possible is the most cost-effective 
way to manage energy demand, and thus to address
our carbon emissions.
> Ensuring security of supply: by reducing demand 
on the gas and electricity distribution networks,
energy efficiency helps to develop improved 
resilience and will reduce our dependence on
imported energy supplies.
> Maintaining competitiveness: by helping consumers 
to reduce their energy bills, energy efficiency helps
UK businesses to be more productive and competitive.
> Tackling fuel poverty: improving the energy standards
of homes has an important role in reducing spending
on fuel by those in fuel poverty.”
The Action Plan went on to assert that “across the economy
as a whole it is estimated that we could reduce energy use
by around 30%. To deliver this we need, over the next two
decades, to roughly double the rate of energy efficiency
improvement seen in the past thirty years.”
Since the publication of the Energy White Paper, a number of
studies have emerged in the UK confirming this approach, but
simultaneously lamenting just how slow the Government has
been to make a serious priority of its own Action Plan – let
alone the much more ambitious approach that many experts
now believe is required. 
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Alternative
options
Part four
Based on our own research, the Commission sees no reason
why we should not set our sights much higher in terms of
improvements in energy efficiency. For instance, the final
report from the Sustainable Consumption Round Table (due
out end April) puts great emphasis on the importance of
designing products so as to reduce energy consumption at
source. The realisation that leaving electronic and electrical
devices on stand-by requires the equivalent of a 1500 MW
power station has woken people up to the importance of
product design, but not to the fact that some new products
(domestic air conditioning, for example) are constantly
exacerbating the overall demand management challenge. 
We are concerned that a surprisingly large number of MPs
and civil servants would appear to have consigned the
potential for such efficiency gains to the “too difficult”
category, requiring as it does a wide range of effective
interventions in the marketplace to influence both individual
and corporate behaviour. Exactly on what evidence that
pessimism is based is something of a mystery, as many other
countries would appear to have done much better than us 
on energy efficiency, and the Government itself acknowledges
freely that our own efforts in this regard have until now been
inconsistent and inadequate.
3. Renewables
The UK has some of the best renewable energy resources
anywhere in the world. This is particularly the case offshore,
where the theoretical potential of marine renewables and
offshore wind power is considerable. We are deeply disappointed
at the way in which the current energy review (Our Energy
Challenge) seems intent on talking down this potential,
treating renewables more as an add-on than the principal
driver of a genuinely sustainable energy supply strategy.
We have studied three recent reports on the potential 
of renewables in the UK, from the Institute of Electrical
Engineers (IEE), the Tyndall Centre, and the Government’s 
own Interdepartmental Analysts’ Group (IAG) in its work 
for the 2003 Energy White Paper. 
All have sought to assess what is called the “practicable
renewable resource” which is very different from the
“theoretical resource” – the theoretical maximum available
before spatial, infrastructure and environmental considerations
are taken into account. Such calculations still need to be
treated with caution, but they give a good sense of the 
scale of the different resources. 
All three studies indicate an enormous potential for
renewables in the UK. Without taking geothermal energy 
into account, both the IEE and the Tyndall Centre assessed 
our practicable resource at around 85% of current electricity
production. The IAG is more modest in its projections: with
costs held at between 5p and 7p a kilowatt hour (which
represents a substantial increase on current electricity prices)
it assesses the practicable resource for 2025 at around 68% of
current electricity production. (Further details of all the studies
can be found in our evidence base, Paper Two). 
Whilst some of us remain pretty sceptical about projections 
of this kind, one would expect the total practicable resource
to increase over time in line with technological developments.
For instance, although the potential for biomass-based
technology is included in the above figures, the new report
from the Biomass Task Force has already come to some rather
more ambitious conclusions about the practicable resource in
this area.
Technological breakthroughs could prove to be particularly
important with technologies such as photovoltaic cells, 
which convert sunlight directly into electricity. The theoretical
potential here is enormous, though still limited by economic
considerations. 
However, PV costs have been falling by around 5% per
annum over the last few years, and there are significant
economies of scale still to be realised. When launching the
Energy White Paper in 2003, the Prime Minister reminded his
audience (quoting from the White Paper) that solar energy
alone “could meet world energy demand by using less than
1% of land currently used for agriculture”. Yet investment
here in the UK has been pitiful in comparison to Germany and
Japan. California recently announced ambitious plans to install
1 million roofs with solar arrays; San Francisco recently voted
in a $100 million bond for solar and wind power in their city.
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Where is the equivalent sense of purpose and technological
dynamism here in the UK?
We’re not advocating that we should go down such paths
unthinkingly. It is worth bearing in mind that all renewable
technologies also have some environmental costs – and 
cause some CO2 to be emitted in their manufacture. For
instance, were the UK Government to pursue the possibility 
of large-scale tidal barrages (and we believe it should
certainly re-open consideration of their potential), it would
undoubtedly prove extremely controversial with a number 
of environmental organisations because of the potential
impact on biodiversity.
Though not technically a “renewable” option in the same 
way as solar or wind, energy from waste is also included 
in the above figures – and is also very controversial. The
potential resource here is significant, and we are concerned
that environmental opposition to energy from waste has
simply not kept up with the degree to which the technology
has moved on from the kind of mass burn incinerators 
that inflicted so much damage on the environment in 
the past. These days, energy from waste, particularly at
smaller scale, represents a viable and cost effective source
of electricity production that could be introduced with
minimal pollution and minimal impact on recycling or 
waste minimisation strategies. 
4. Further options
4.1 Microgeneration
“Unfortunately, the UK has a poor record with microgeneration
technologies, a term which includes small-scale renewables
and micro-CHP. In every technology grouping – be it solar
water heaters, biomass or small-scale wind – we lag behind
our international competitors, often by a very wide margin.
(Our forthcoming report, Committing to Microgeneration, goes
into much greater detail on this). 
Recent work for the DTI by the Energy Saving Trust highlights
the long-term potential of microgeneration to make a serious
contribution to UK energy supply. By 2050, it believes that
microgeneration could contribute 30-40% of the UK’s electricity
needs, representing a 15% decrease in CO2 emissions. Most 
of this potential is from micro-CHP and the use of domestic
fuel cell technology.
4.2 Combined heat and power (CHP)
The UK currently has a target for 10GW of electricity from
good quality CHP by 2010. However, progress against this 
has been disappointing, with little more than 50% of this
target achieved to date. CHP substantially improves the
efficiency of electricity generation and transmission, saving
CO2 in the process.
Virtually all the scenarios we considered see an expanded 
role for CHP as a way to bring forward rapid reductions 
in CO2 emissions using currently available technology. The
Commission intends to look at this issue in more detail, 
as we believe there is still huge potential for more use 
of community heating schemes and CHP in commercial
buildings. (The potential of micro-CHP is covered above 
under Microgeneration.)
4.3 Carbon capture and storage (CCS)
Many of the technological processes behind CCS are already
well established in the oil and gas industry. For example, 
the separation of natural gas into CO2 and hydrogen is 
well understood, as is the injection of CO2 in old oil fields 
(as part of ‘enhanced oil recovery’). However, there is still 
a huge amount of development work needed to bring 
these processes together, and to bring down costs so that
conventional fossil fuel plants using CCS become a viable
option for electricity generation. (Cost estimates based on
today’s technologies are in the range of $50 to $300 for 
each tonne of carbon emissions avoided).
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The theoretical potential of CCS is limited only by the supply
of fossil fuels and appropriate storage sites for the CO2. 
In the UK, we have a number of viable storage options,
including disused oil and gas fields and, potentially, coal
seams or saline aquifers. The current Review should 
generate evidence to indicate the size of the technically 
and economically deliverable contribution that CCS could
make to UK generation over different timescales.
There are still a number of major concerns that will need 
to be addressed – namely the security of stored CO2, 
long-term ownership and responsibility for the stored CO2,
negotiation of disposal of ‘waste’ at sea or sub-sea, possible
environmental impacts, and cost – but CCS seems to have
significant potential and is attracting increasing interest from
governments and industry. 
The international perspective makes the case for exploring the
potential of CCS even more compelling. Fast-growing countries
such as China and India currently have plans for very large
numbers of new coal- and gas-fired power plants over the
next few decades. There is a growing realisation that unless
such countries are offered viable ways of dealing with the
associated CO2 emissions, those plants are likely to result in
huge increases in emissions. The UK is in a good position to
develop those technologies, making use of our substantial
offshore experience, and the benefits of such work would 
be widespread.
The Commission welcomes the surge of interest in CCS, but
believes this should not obscure the overwhelming problems
still associated with any major role for coal in the long run.
Coal is still the highest CO2 emitter as well as a major source
of other air pollutants, and causes the death of thousands 
of miners every year in accidents and through ongoing 
health problems. CCS for coal has a potential role to play 
as a ‘bridge technology’, but should not be seen as a long-
term “sustainable” alternative.
4.4 Hydrogen
Many would argue that we should simultaneously be
investing a great deal more in various hydrogen-based
technologies (particularly the fuel cell), not primarily as a
source of electricity in its own right, but for storage purposes
and for alternatives to the internal combustion engine.
Fuel cells are already available commercially, but their cost 
is still a huge barrier to widespread adoption – they currently
cost about £2,000 per kilowatt, about ten times too expensive
to be commercially viable in cars.
Our studies have not gone into any depth on the potential for
hydrogen. Over and above the problems associated with the
development of fuel cells (which most experts believe will
take several more years to crack), there is the whole question
of how to produce the hydrogen itself. It requires a lot of
energy to extract the hydrogen from water (through
electrolysis), and the only way to make hydrogen genuinely
“carbon-neutral” is to use renewable energy for that purpose.
Given how much renewable power we now need for direct
electricity generation, this seems a very big ask. By the same
token, plans for using nuclear power to produce the huge
quantities of hydrogen that would be required if fuel cell
technologies replace the internal combustion engine, face
precisely the same dilemmas surfaced in Part Two of this
document. 
Our Energy Challenge puts it as follows:
“Unless there is a great increase in the amount of carbon-free
energy available to produce hydrogen in the UK, its main
benefits will be to reduce demand for oil rather than to
reduce carbon emissions. Much work also needs to be done
on fuel cell technology, hydrogen storage technology, and
hydrogen distribution before hydrogen cars can compete with
conventional vehicles on performance, cost and convenience.” 
But it’s right that we should continue to push ahead as
energetically as possible, with further research into all aspects
of a hydrogen-based transport economy.
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5. The overall picture
One would need to be extremely pessimistic not to be
heartened by the diversity and scale of the alternatives
available to us. It is a regrettable aspect of those campaigning
for a renewed nuclear power programme that they feel they
have to disparage the potential for renewables, energy
efficiency, CHP and so on. The very close links between 
the nuclear lobby and campaigns against wind power are
particularly disturbing.
Regardless of what may eventually be decided about nuclear
power, we should be pursuing all of these options as
purposefully and urgently as possible. Although this piece 
of work has avoided any consideration of the debate about
diminishing supplies of oil and gas (the so-called “peak oil”
debate), even the most basic of precautionary approaches
tells us that the days of cheap fossil fuels are rapidly waning.
Whether global oil production peaks in the next five years, 
or the next ten, or the next fifteen, is in effect immaterial: 
any responsible government should be preparing its people
for the inevitability of diminishing access to oil and gas, and
to the rapidly rising prices that will accompany this transition. 
That’s what the debate on “security of supply” should really
be focussing on, and it is startling to us to see just how
complacent and detached from reality the Government
remains on this critical area of concern. 
The good news is that the UK has the theoretical potential to
supply a substantial proportion of our current consumption of
electricity from a broad range of renewables in the long-term.
And we could increase our use of CHP and bring forward the
development of carbon capture and storage technologies to
make the use of fossil fuels less damaging on an interim basis.
This broad approach is reflected in the DTI’s own work on
modelling different carbon abatement technologies through 
to 2050, published in June 2005. To reduce our CO2 emissions
by 60% by 2050, whilst the economy continues to grow at 
an average of 2.2% per annum, will require both dramatic
improvements in energy efficiency and substantial reductions
in emissions from power generation. 
The DTI’s report presents a series of scenarios through to
2050, some assuming a new nuclear programme, and some
assuming no new nuclear programme. The base line “no new
nuclear” scenario looks like this:
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It may well be that this is putting too many of our eggs in the
CCS basket – given the current lack of robust evidence for the
scale of its potential contribution, and especially if supplies of
gas are themselves subject to much greater instability in the
gas supply market at some stage in the not too distant future.
Here again, the Commission would argue that this merely
strengthens the case for accelerated investments in energy
efficiency, CHP, renewables and microgeneration.
It will by now be abundantly clear that any combination of
alternatives of this kind hardly constitutes “an easy option”.
Historically, governments have tended to favour large-scale,
centralised energy supply solutions. They are nervous of 
more fragmented, ‘distributed’ solutions, with the emphasis
on the very small-scale and on demand management rather
than supply. 
That remains the clear preference of many politicians,
regardless of their feelings about nuclear power. Aggressively
driving down energy demand will be difficult and
controversial. Many environmentalists will be appalled at 
the prospect of large-scale tidal barrages, or the widespread
use of tidal stream technologies; after all, many are still not
reconciled to the imminent development of huge off-shore
wind farms. Deriving more energy from waste (however
advanced the technologies may now be) remains unacceptable
to most local communities. Carbon capture and storage
remains largely unproven, apart from a few encouraging
prototype schemes. And we’ve had real difficulties in the 
UK maximising the potential of CHP in the way so many 
other countries have succeeded in doing. 
We also want to stress, at this stage, that we have focussed
almost exclusively in this publication on the situation here 
in the UK. The situation looks very different in France, China,
Germany, India, the United States and so on. Even those
Commissioners least persuaded of the case for nuclear here 
in the UK, acknowledge that it is not appropriate to make
blanket judgements relating to any use of nuclear power 
in any country, where comparisons between a nuclear 
option and the full range of available alternatives will be
equally complex. 
We are nevertheless very impressed by the recent
announcement on the part of the Swedish Government 
to totally eliminate Sweden’s dependence on oil by 2020
without building any new nuclear power stations. That 
plan deserves close scrutiny in the current Energy Review. 
The headline conclusion of this section is that we
believe that there is a range of different ways for 
the UK to meet its CO2 and energy security objectives
without relying on a new generation of nuclear 
power plants. Indeed, the Sustainable Development
Commission categorically rejects the assertion made 
by a number of independent experts and advisors to
government that there are no such alternatives. 
That alternative may not be as persuasive or compelling
to some as the nuclear option, but an alternative it
indisputably is, and needs therefore to be re-appraised
on exactly the same basis and with the same degree 
of rigour and impartiality as the nuclear option.
The good news is that the
UK has the theoretical
potential to supply 
a substantial proportion of
our current consumption
of electricity from a broad
range of renewables in the
long-term.
“
”
20 Is nuclear power the answer? www.sd-commission.org.uk
1. Reaffirming the
common ground
In the introduction to this publication we described the
process we have been through as a “journey of exploration”,
based on the eight comprehensive research reports and our
summary analysis (Nuclear Power in a Low Carbon Economy)
that accompany this publication. Commissioners have devoted
a lot of time to undertaking this journey, not least because
we are so determined to ensure that the process by which
any decision is arrived at in this area is properly transparent,
rigorous and inclusive. We needed to meet those criteria in
terms of our own process.
We’ve completed that journey reaffirming that we have
complete unanimity on the following conclusions:
The accelerating pace of climate change is a massive concern
– indeed, climate change is probably the most serious issue
our civilisation has ever had to face. Current measures to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases are completely inadequate.
At the same time, rising energy costs and concerns about the
UK being able to secure access to supplies of energy in the
future, demand much greater clarity about our long-term
energy strategy.
The starting point for this must be energy efficiency. There 
is still a vast potential for promoting energy efficiency in all
sectors, with great benefit to the economy and consumers.
We could halve the energy consumption of our homes and
offices using existing energy efficiency measures and CHP. 
As yet, the Government has failed to get on top of this
challenge, worsening all our problems in terms of future
energy supply choices.
The potential for renewables in the UK is enormous. Despite
some important developments, our current approach remains
half-hearted. It is critical that the Government should now
invest far more (both politically and financially) in renewables,
including small-scale, ‘microgeneration’ technologies.
The rationale for a long-term energy strategy, based on
energy efficiency, renewables and the cleaner and more
efficient use of fossil fuels (including CHP) was authoritatively
established in the 2003 Energy White Paper.
Since then, the Government has explored the possibility 
that a programme of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
would reinforce the viability of the White Paper’s approach, 
as would an accelerated investment programme in
microgeneration technologies.
The Sustainable Development Commission is absolutely 
clear that the primary responsibility of the UK
Government, at this point, is to drive forward that
strategy with far greater urgency and purposefulness
than it has demonstrated to date.
It must simultaneously turn its attention to policy areas that
are currently completely at odds with its own climate change
objectives, particularly road transport and aviation. Electricity
represents only one third of the UK’s total energy consumption,
so it’s wrong to focus exclusively on electricity supply.
However, it is still a wholly legitimate question to ask
whether or not even a flat-out non-nuclear strategy of that
kind provides a sufficient response to the increasingly serious
problems of climate change and energy security.
Nuclear power is clearly one of the technologies that could
generate large quantities of electricity, contributing materially
to reducing CO2 emissions and adding to the diversity of the
UK’s energy supply.
The Sustainable
Development
Commission’s
advice to
Government
Part five
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2. Alternative
positions on 
nuclear power
Having established that common ground, and in the light 
of the extensive research we have carried out over the last
nine months, the SDC has debated three diverging positions:
Position 1
Nuclear power continues to perform badly when assessed
against key sustainable development principles. In considering
the range of alternative options that are still available to us here
in the UK, it should therefore not be pursued as part of the
country’s response to the twin challenges of climate change and
energy security. The non-nuclear strategy outlined in the 2003
Energy White Paper should now be pursued with much greater
vigour and urgency. 
Position 2
There are very serious problems associated with nuclear power,
in terms of potential risks, high costs and ethical dilemmas. The
information currently available on many of these issues (nuclear
waste, choice of reactor design and so on) remains inadequate,
making it impossible for the UK Government to give “the green
light” to a new nuclear programme at this time. The
Government should therefore re-double its efforts to implement
the Energy White Paper, setting much clearer targets for delivery.
At the same time, it should urgently seek clarity on key issues
relating to nuclear waste, reactor design, long-term costs,
handling of liabilities, and so on.
Position 3
The continued use of massive amounts of coal and gas for power
generation is incompatible with securing a low-carbon future for
the UK. Renewables can displace a significant proportion of fossil
fuel power, and a serious energy efficiency programme can
reduce the need still further. But there will remain a gap.
If the Government can satisfy itself and the public that a new
generation of nuclear reactors can be built at a reasonable cost
and to the highest standards of operational safety, and that an
acceptable solution to the problems of waste disposal and
decommissioning can be found, then a new nuclear power
programme should be brought forward to help fill that gap.
In essence, these three positions equate quite simply to:
“NO”; “NOT NOW”; “POSSIBLY”
Eight Commissioners favour Position One. Five favour Position
Two. Two favour Position Three. The Chairman did not cast a vote.
The Sustainable
Development Commission
is absolutely clear that the
primary responsibility 
of the UK Government, 
at this point, is to drive
forward that strategy with
far greater urgency and
purposefulness than it 
has demonstrated to date.
“
”
3. Advice to ministers
3.1 IN VIEW OF OUR OWN MAJORITY CONCLUSION, OUR
ADVICE TO THE GOVERNMENT IS THAT THERE IS NO
JUSTIFICATION FOR BRINGING FORWARD PLANS FOR A
NEW NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME AT THIS TIME, AND
THAT ANY SUCH PROPOSAL WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE
WITH ITS OWN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY.
3.2 However, it is worth elaborating a little on how we
have reached that conclusion, as we fundamentally
disagree with all those (inside and outside
government) who argue that we no longer have any
choice and that a new nuclear power programme is
an absolute necessity. Our research indicates they are
clearly wrong about there not being a choice, as is
reflected in our own deliberations.
3.3 The majority of members of the Commission believe
that, given sufficient drive and support, a non-
nuclear strategy could and should be sufficient 
to deliver all the carbon savings we shall need up 
to 2050 and beyond, and to ensure secure access 
to reliable sources of energy. 
3.4 The relatively small contribution that a new nuclear
power programme would make to addressing these
challenges (even if we were to double our existing
nuclear capacity, this would give an 8% cut on total
emissions from 1990 levels by 2035, and would
contribute next to nothing before 2020) simply
doesn’t justify the substantial disbenefits and costs
that would be entailed in such a programme. 
3.5 As the Sustainable Development Commission, we have 
laid great stress on the intergenerational aspects of 
this decision-making process, particularly with regard 
to the disposal of nuclear waste and decommissioning. 
We are also very concerned that a new nuclear power
programme could lock the UK into an inflexible, 
centralised electricity-generating system for the next 
fifty years – at exactly the time that the potential for 
more decentralised, small-scale approaches is growing 
all the time. 
3.6 Despite that view, the majority of members of the
Commission also believe it is right for the Government 
to continue to assess the potential contribution of new
nuclear technologies for the future, as well as pursuing
answers to our nuclear waste problems as actively 
as possible. 
3.7 Developing a sustainable non-nuclear energy strategy will
not be simple. We need to stop believing in easy fixes.
Ministers will need to think much more creatively about
working directly with citizens to help change our energy-
related behaviours, as is so clearly mapped out in the
Government’s Sustainable Development Strategy. 
3.8 Above all, we will need a focussed low-carbon innovation
strategy, with public funding dramatically increased to 
the levels of our international competitors. This should be
combined with long-term targets for absolute reductions 
in CO2 emissions to provide certainty to the business
community and stimulate private investment. Uptake
should then be encouraged through the smart use of fiscal
incentives, targeted regulations, and an expanded role for
emissions trading schemes. 
3.9 Following this pathway would make the UK a leader 
in low-carbon technologies. If we take full advantage 
of this, we will enhance our economic competitiveness 
while upholding the fundamental principles of sustainable
development.
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A non-nuclear strategy
could and should be
sufficient to deliver all 
the carbon savings we
shall need up to 2050 and
beyond, and to ensure
secure access to reliable
sources of energy.
“
”
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There are many siren
voices urging Ministers 
to pursue a fast-track
approach to this decision,
dispensing with proper
consultation, and short-
circuiting a proper
Parliamentary process.
This would be extremely
foolish.
“
”
4. Advice regarding
next steps
4.1 Acting on the assumption that the current Review 
(Our Energy Challenge) is indeed a genuinely impartial
process, dispassionately reviewing the evidence available
to Ministers (including our own research) rather than
rationalising a pre-determined decision with a tokenistic
consultation exercise thrown in for good measure, we
strongly recommend that one of the principal outcomes 
of the Review, as regards nuclear power, should be to
formulate distinctive positions (broadly along the lines 
of the Commission’s positions outlined above), and then 
to indicate which of those positions the Government is
minded to pursue in due course. 
4.2 Given the critical importance of this decision, and
regardless of which position the Government declares 
it is minded to pursue, systematic engagement with 
the general public should be seen as a precondition 
of transparent and effective policy–making in this area. 
The history of the nuclear industry is littered with hasty,
partisan and secretive studies leading to expensive
mistakes and public hostility.
4.3 Once the Review has been published, outlining the
Government’s broad intentions, at least nine months should
then be set aside for a range of much more substantive
consultative and engagement processes, carefully planned
in advance and presided over by independent experts and
advisors. Any attempt to force top-down solutions on the
British public at this stage, with a process fixed by
Government to fit pre-determined outcomes, will lead 
in all probability to widespread mistrust and hostility.
4.4 These engagement processes should also take on board
consideration of any conclusions arising from the CoRWM
Report, which is due at almost the same time as the
Energy Review itself. It may also prove possible to consult
on some of the interim findings of the Stern Review on the
Economics of Climate Change. 
4.5 It is our strong recommendation that this engagement
process should not be based on a narrow ‘pro’ or ‘anti’
nuclear power debate, but should be set within a more
compelling context of what it will mean to plan for 
and deliver a low-carbon future for people in the UK.
Widespread ignorance of the scale and urgency of the
changes ahead are deeply unhelpful both to policy-makers
and to the business community.
4.6 During that time, the Government should seek to fill 
some of the yawning research gaps that have become
apparent in our own investigations (including the 
technical and economic potential for CCS for the UK), 
and should start to develop a comprehensive response 
to the recommendations of the CoRWM Report.
4.7 The Government should then reflect on the outcomes
both of its engagement with the general public and any
new research findings, with a view to bringing forward 
a White Paper in 2007.
4.8 In conclusion, a proper transparent process is 
all-important. There are many siren voices urging
Ministers to pursue a fast-track approach to this decision,
dispensing with proper consultation, and short-circuiting 
a proper Parliamentary process. This would be extremely
foolish, and would inevitably (and justifiably) result 
in a backlash against whatever the Government
eventually decides is the right way forward for the UK 
at this critical time.
Design by The Forster Company www.forster.co.uk  Printed by Severnprint Ltd.
Printed on Revive Uncoated paper which contains 80% de-inked post consumer waste and a maximum of 20% mill broke.

Contact us
You can contact the Sustainable Development Commission at:
London (main office): 
Sustainable Development Commission, 
Ground Floor, Ergon House, Horseferry Road, 
London, SW1P 2AL
Telephone: 020 7238 4999  
Email: enquiries@sd-commission.org.uk  
www.sd-commission.org.uk
Edinburgh: 0131 244 0140
Scotland@sd-commission.org.uk
www.sd-commission.org.uk/scotland
Belfast: 02890 257346
N.Ireland@sd-commission.org.uk
Cardiff: 029 2082 6382
Wales@sd-commission.org.uk
www.sd-commission.org.uk/wales
